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Burdett Loomis* and Timothy J. Barnett
Thinking about my Generation: The Impact 
of Large Congressional Cohorts
Abstract: Large partisan congressional “classes,” once common, have become more 
the exception than the rule over the past 60 years. Thus, when they come along, as 
in 1974 and 1994 (and perhaps 2010), they receive a lot of attention. Moreover, they 
often do help to change the institution of the House in dramatic ways. After a few 
years, all such classes lose their distinctiveness and meld into the legislative flow 
of the era. Still, these cohorts may have lasting effects in a host of ways, from move-
ment into House power positions, to successful attempts to run for the Senate in 
large numbers, to the dispersion of many individuals into the Washington milieu of 
lobbyists and lawyers, where they can continue to affect policy. This article takes 
a first cut at how large partisan classes affect the institution of Congress, as well 
as at the careers of their individual members. Both the 1994 and 1974 cohorts were 
important as they burst upon the scene. Yet they have had differing impacts as the 
“long tail” of these classes continues to make a mark on politics and policy.
DOI 10.1515/for-2014-5018
Introduction
“We didn’t owe anything to any ward heelers. We were pretty brash, not scared. We didn’t 
know that we shouldn’t take on a [committee] chairman.”
– Rep. Floyd Fithian, freshman Democrat from Class of 1974
“We first sent a letter to each chairman asking that they come to one of the [Class of 1974s pre-
organizational caucus] meetings and talk a little about their committee. To a person, we got 
back polite notes saying “No.” So then we sent a second letter saying that we were going to 
vote en masse against any chairman who didn’t come. They all came. Even [F. Edward] Hebert 
[Armed Services chair], who showed up the day before the Super Bowl in New Orleans.”1
*Corresponding author: Burdett Loomis: Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas, 
1541 Lilac Lane, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA, cell: 785.864.9033/785.766.2764,  
e-mail: bloomis@ku.edu
Timothy J. Barnett: Department of Political Science and PA, Jacksonville State University, 700 
Pelham Rd., North Jacksonville, AL 36265-1602, USA
1 Both quoted in Burdett Loomis, The New American Politician (New York: Basic, 1988).
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Even before they were sworn in, the 75 members of the House Democratic 
class of 1975 had changed the way business was conducted in the US House, often 
bucking the party leadership as they sought to influence various organizational 
decisions. Within 3 weeks of their swearing in, they had proven instrumental in 
ousting three sitting committee chairs, including Hebert. Thus began an auspi-
cious run for the members of this cohort, who initially held great sway within party 
caucus decision-making and who subsequently, over the next few years, advanced 
quickly into committee and leadership positions that they had helped to create.
Twenty years later, another large partisan class helped usher in a new and 
historic Republican era in the US House. Like the Democratic newcomers 20 years 
before, even before they took the oath of office, this cohort aggressively worked to 
change the rules of the game. As Linda Killian recounted in her extensive exami-
nation of this group, “They were all for term limits, so why shouldn’t they term-
limit committee chairs and even the Speaker? Newt Gingrich learned of their little 
idea by reading about it in the paper…. So the first day it was in session, the 104th 
Congress passed a rule limiting the Speaker of the House to four terms. The fresh-
men didn’t know how Gingrich would react when he read about their comments, 
but when nothing did happen, it gave them courage…Every time they pushed a 
little further and got away with it, it just made them bolder.”2
By and large, the modern US Congress is a model of year-to-year continuity, 
despite profound long-term changes across the decades. The membership tends to 
remain stable. Even when there is a major upheaval – such as in 1992 when reap-
portionment, redistricting, and the House “bank” crisis took its toll across party 
lines – 75-to-80% of sitting members return. In many congresses, such as the 105th 
(1997–1998) through the 109th (2005–2006), only a trickle of new members enters 
the chamber. But from time to time, large “classes” of new members come into 
the House, often with overwhelming numbers of either Republicans or Democrats. 
These classes, such as the heavily Democratic “Watergate Babies” of 1974 or the 
horde of Republicans in Newt Gingrich’s 1994 cohort, can quickly and powerfully 
change the nature of the institution, often strengthening the hand of leaders like 
Gingrich or the insurgent Democratic reformers of the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
most recent landslide class, from the GOP wave of 2010, may well stand beside 
these previous two groups in their impact on the institution, for better or worse.
Journalists circa 1974–1975, and both scholars3 and journalists circa 1994–
1995, gave great attention to these large, partisan cohorts (75 new Democrats in 
2 Linda Killian, The Freshmen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
3 Timothy J. Barnett, Legislative Learning: The 104th Republican Freshmen in the House (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1999); C, Lawrence Evans and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress under Fire (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1997); Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Learning to Govern (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 
1997); David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, Tell Newt to Shut Up (INew York: Touchstone, 1996).
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1974; 73 new Republicans in 1994), and with good reason. The Watergate class pro-
vided both the votes and the energy that helped Democratic Study Group reform-
ers accelerate their attacks on the seniority system, most notably with their early 
contribution to defeating three sitting chairs at the start of the 94th Congress. 
Even more consequentially, the 104th’s GOP first-termers provided the core of Gin-
grich’s broadside assault on committee seniority. Moreover, both classes shook 
up the institution and caused a reexamination of the linkages between individual 
members, legislative party leaders, and committee (and subcommittee) chairs.
Congressional classes/cohorts rarely make news for very long; often they do 
not survive at the polls. The Watergate babies survived extremely well until 1980, 
when the Reagan landslide helped push some marginal and weaker legislators to 
the side. The 104th Republican legislators did not face a serious Democratic wave 
election until 2006, but still they lost many members of the class during these 12 
years. Overall, and unsurprisingly, legislators from these and other large classes 
do leave the House for a host of reasons, and the distinctiveness of any given 
cohort fades.
But that does not mean that the impact of large partisan cohorts necessarily 
diminishes. Rather, it may change form and remain profound. A large partisan 
class ushers into Congress a host of individuals with similar backgrounds and 
worldviews, who were propelled within a distinct set of political circumstances. 
Even as their numbers decline, their impact may grow, as they become (sub) com-
mittee chairs, party leaders, and achieve higher office. So, during the 40 years 
after the Class of 1974 burst upon the scene, its final two continuously serving 
members, Californians Henry Waxman and George Miller, both retiring in 2014, 
have proven exceptionally important in terms of producing meaningful policy 
change across a range of issues. In a sense, such members and their accomplish-
ments represent the “long tail” of decisions that voters made 1974.
To an extent, the impact of large partisan classes is a matter of mathemat-
ics. At first, if the cohort votes together, it can move the caucus toward policy 
changes and procedural reforms. As time passes, large classes can also benefit 
from the observation made by novelist Ward Just’s fictional congressman, Lou 
LaRuth, “There are 435 members of the House, and about a quarter are quite 
smart.”4 Although some of the less-smart ones will have long careers, the chances 
are that the best legislators will prosper – whether in the House, in other elected 
office, or in various subsequent endeavors. The wave election that elevated them 
to the House meant that they had ascended to “national politician” status, albeit 
on the lowest rung of that ladder. In addition, as Glenn Parker observes in his 
4 Ward Just, “The Congressman Who Loved Flaubert,” in The Congressman Who Loved Flaubert 
and 21 Stories and Novellas. (New York: Mariner, 1998).
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book, Capitol Investments, serving as a Member of Congress can allow legislators 
to accumulate a host of skills that will serve them well, long after they have left 
Congress.5
In this piece, we will lay out some of the implications of the election of large 
partisan classes. But we can only scratch the surface among populations that 
enter the Congress together, make their immediate mark, and then move on in 
their individual ways. There are patterns, to be sure, but these gaggles of legis-
lators carve out their own distinctive careers, producing a mosaic of ambition, 
choice, defeat, and evolution.
A Brief History of Large Partisan Classes
The 104th Republican freshman class in the US House of Representatives is 
generally viewed as one of several highly consequential House partisan cohorts 
in the post-JFK Great Society era. Elected in November of 1994 and 73 members 
strong, the relatively cohesive group came to office with the most media fanfare of 
any House freshman class since the political insurgency of the Democratic Water-
gate Babies class in the elections of 1974.
That Democratic class, 75 members strong and in some ways a model to the 
subsequent rising Republican class, made the 94th Congress a memorable one, 
especially for progressive Democratic activists wishing to offset the influence of 
conservative southern Democratic legislators in the House. As things stood in 
1974, the House was less liberal than strong Democratic numbers made it appear 
on the surface. Twenty straight years of Democratic Party control in the House 
had allowed considerable influence to be vested in senior members, with those 
from the South holding many committee and subcommittee chairmanships 
because the South’s near-one party system afforded longevity of service to the 
region’s lawmakers.
Prior to the 1950s, large freshman classes frequently appeared in the US. 
House, sometimes creating back-and-forth control of the chamber. Since 1950, 
however, relative partisan stability has dominated. Thus, from 1950 to 2014, only 
six uncommonly large, influential, and partisan freshman cohorts entered the 
House: Democrats in 1958 (86th Congress), 1964 (89th), and 1974 (94th), along 
with the Republicans in 1966 (90th), 1994 (104th), and 2010 (112th). (See Table 1).
5 Glenn Parker Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2008).
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Table 1 Large, Partisan First-term House Cohorts, 1867–2014.
Congress  Years  Seats  Seat 
Gain





42  1871–1873  243  67 > 104  (37)  55%  15%  D
43  1873–1875  243/292  136 > 199  (63)  46%  22%  R
44  1875–1877  292/293  88 > 182  (94)  107%  32%  D
45  1877–1879  293  103 > 136  (33)  32%  11%  R*
48  1883–1885  293/325  128 > 196  (68)  53%  21%  D
52  1891–1893  332  152 > 238  (86)  57%  26%  D
54  1895–1897  356/357  124 > 254  (130)  105%  36%  R
56  1899–1901  357  124 > 161  (37)  30%  10%  D*
59  1905–1907  386  207 > 251  (44)  21%  11%  R#
62  1911–1913  391/394  172 > 230  (58)  35%  15%  D
64  1915–1917  391/435  134 > 196  (62)  46%  14%  R*
67  1921–1923  435  240 > 302  (62)  26%  14%  R#
68  1923–1925  435  131–207  (76)  58%  17%  D*
72  1931–1933  435  164 > 216  (52)  32%  12%  D
73  1933–1935  435  216 > 313  (97)  45%  22%  D#
76  1939–1941  435  88 > 169  (81)  29%  11%  R*
80  1947–1949  435  189 > 246  (57)  30%  13%  R
81  1949–1951  435  188 > 263  (75)  40%  17%  D
86  1959–1961  435  232 > 283  (61)  22%  12%  D#
90  1967–1969  435  140 > 187  (47)  34%  11%  R*
94  1975–1977  435  243 > 292  (49)  20%  11%  D#
104  1995–1997  435  176 > 228  (52)  30%  12%  R
112  2011–2013  435  178 > 242  (64)  36%  15%  R
*Did not capture majority.
#Added to existing majority.
Source: http:/history.house.gov.
Although much of our attention will be directed largely at the 1974 Demo-
crats and the 1994 Republicans, it is worth taking a brief look at the other large 
partisan groups. The newest of these, the 112th GOP freshman class of 2011, has 
already made its mark in adding to the polarization and gridlock on Capitol Hill. 
With its Tea Party insurgents, this group, while highly partisan, has posed many 
obstacles for the House GOP leadership.6 The 112th Congress returned majority 
control back to the Republicans and Speaker John Boehner, but the jury remains 
out as to the long-term impact of this group. It certainly has had far less immedi-
ate policy impact than either the 1974 or 1994 classes, even as it questioned our 
idea of how party majorities work (or do not) in the House.
6 Robert Draper, When the Tea Party Came to Town (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013).
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In contrast to the 104th and 112th GOP cohorts, the other three large freshman 
groups in recent decades did not bring a change of party control to the House. 
The 86th Congress’s Democratic freshman class, elected in 1958, vastly strength-
ened the party’s hold on the chamber but did not shift control of committees and 
subcommittees. What it did do was to sweep into the House (and Senate) a group 
of members who would provide both votes and ideas for reform over the next 
20 years. Likewise, the 90th Republican freshman class in the House, elected in 
1966, helped pad the party’s pitiful numbers in the chamber (up from 140 to 187). 
Nonetheless, this class did little to bring the party out of the wilderness, even as 
it did provide votes that led to victories by the chamber’s powerful conservative 
coalition.
Setting aside the 86th and 90th partisan freshman classes in the House, the 
104th and 112th GOP classes are notable because they helped their party recapture 
the chamber and the legislative ambition that comes with a hypothetical electoral 
mandate. The 89th Democratic freshman class is notable in its short-term influ-
ence because it pushed party numbers to the point that liberals could pass much 
of Lyndon Johnson’s extensive policy agenda.7 When it comes to evaluating the 
consequence of a new partisan cohort in the House, class size and the swing of 
seats in the chamber both matter.
In determining what constitutes a consequential or exceptional freshman 
cohort in the House, there is no standard rule. In differentiating relatively influ-
ential House classes from those of lesser import, it is possible to utilize qualitative 
factors as well as quantitative measures, especially as we examine the impact of 
a cohort over time. Here, however, for purposes of clarity and consistency, we 
suggest a metric based upon the total number of seats in the House – 435 in the 
modern era but a smaller number previously. We consider relatively influential 
freshman classes to exist whenever there is a 10% swing in the partisan control of 
House seats, based upon the total number of House seats available, rather than 
the party’s gain from the number of seats held in the previous election.
Large Partisan Classes: 1876–2014
Adopting the 10% rule allows us to examine the substantial number of 24 fresh-
man classes over a stretch of 62 Congresses starting in 1867. The starting point is 
chosen because it reflects a renewal of congressional representation for states 
that had departed for the southern confederacy during the Civil War. Table 1 lists 
7 David Mayhew, Party Loyalty among Congressmen (Cambridge: Harvard, 1966); James 
Sundquist, Politics and Policy-Making (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1968).
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US House elections in the post-Civil War era (beginning with the reconstituted 
US House in 1867) in which a political party met the 10% threshold for seats 
gained. With the Apportionment Act of 1911, House membership was set at 435 
representatives, effective in 1913 (the 63rd Congress), thus setting a standard of a 
44-seat gain to qualify as a major partisan class.
An examination of Table 1 suggests a US House that has become increas-
ingly stable in recent decades, at least in terms of tidal-wave partisan swings that 
produce big freshman classes and an enhanced chance for major policy change. 
Table 1 does not, however, provide a qualitative sense of the operational power 
of freshman House classes. An analysis of that type requires knowledge of party 
leadership dynamics in the House, the political resources and prior political 
experience of new members, the cohesiveness of the cohort, and the degree to 
which the dominant cohort vision corresponds with the collective goals of the 
party’s conference or caucus in the House.
At the minimum, the data in Table 1 suggest that large House partisan cohorts 
in today’s world may be more polarizing than such House cohorts in the pre-
Nixon era, principally because large cohorts have become uncommon following 
the emergence of the 1974 Watergate Babies. After all, as David Mayhew observed 
in 1974, the individually based electoral connection had grown increasingly pow-
erful, thus creating “the case of the vanishing marginals,” which political sci-
entists pursued for a generation.8 Most simply, fewer marginal members meant 
fewer large partisan swings.9 And the Class of 1974 helped make this so, as they 
assiduously protected their gains over the next 20 years.10 In the day where large 
classes were common – a new one every two or three elections, or less – new 
cohorts tended to reduce the impact of previous large swings. Moreover, relatively 
frequent large classes meant that those who survived, disproportionately south-
ern Democrats, could build seniority and exercise continuing, predictable power.
A Modern Example in this Comparative Metric
While the Republican freshmen of the 104th Congress are often treated in our 
time as a remarkable expression of this dynamics, it would actually be a mistake 
to see them a as unique in terms of their cohort clout. While there is significant 
8 David Mayhew, “The Case of the Vanishing Marginals,” Polity 6, no. 3 (1974), 295–317.
9 Still, both individual cases in the 1990s and the partisan swings of 2006, 2008, and 2010 dem-
onstrate that context of electoral safety can change over time. See Gary Jacobson, The Politics of 
Congressional Elections, 9th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2012); Thomas Mann, Unsafe at any Margin 
(Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institution Press, 1978).
10 Loomis, The New American Politician.
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evidence as to their cohesiveness during their first two terms in office,11 Table 1 
highlights the existence of other post-Civil War freshmen classes of considera-
ble note. Quantitatively speaking, this table identifies classes that relative to the 
104th GOP House class are more impressive by a number of measures. Looking at 
the raw percentage gain in House seats, there are seven House freshman classes 
that experienced the headiness associated with their party adding sufficient seats 
to increase their power in the chamber by over 50%. Compared with the 30% 
expansion of the Republican House conference in the 1994 election, the 104th 
freshman class did not ride the strongest of waves.
In a similar fashion, while the 1994 election expanded GOP representation by 
12% of the total number of seats in the House, this gain is modest when viewed 
historically. To wit, in six elections since 1867 one party has increased its numbers 
by more than 20% of all the seats in the House, including the elections of 1874 
and 1894, which exceeded 30%.12
Another possible measure for assessing the power of the 104th freshman class 
is the size of the new majority constituted from the entry of any given freshman 
class. As Table 1 denotes, the 104th House Republicans held a modest majoritar-
ian margin of 228 seats out of 435 (52.4%). In comparison, nine other influential 
cohort freshman classes have enjoyed the advantage of helping their party form a 
majority over 60%, the average of the eight approaching 67% – the super-majority 
size that allowed for the override of presidential vetoes. In view of these findings, 
it makes sense to think of the 104th GOP House freshman class as an especially 
scrappy and partisan class: one that exercised considerable influence not merely 
because of turnover in the chamber, cohort vote clout, or the extent of the party’s 
seat control, but because party-based voting jumped substantially after 1994,13 
even as this class reflected the growth of such voting over time.
The Watergate Babies and the Gingrich Cohort: 
Adaptation and Polarization
Every congressional class, large or small, enters a particular Congress, with its 
own internal environment, political pressures, and relevant issues. One never 
11 Barnett, Legislative Learning. 
12 The fact that these two elections preceded the post-Watergate and Gingrich elections by 
100 years stands as an odd historical tidbit.
13 See Barnett, 1999; Fenno, 1997; Killian, 1998, among others. See also Voteview’s figures, 
which illustrate the role of the 104th Congress. http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp 
(accessed August 18, 2014).
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steps into the same river, so to speak, even as it appears the same from the bank. 
Thus, the 1964 Democratic cohort, with myriad talented legislators, found itself 
serving as “the cannon fodder for the Great Society,” as many members from 
swing districts compiled liberal voting records, with the upshot that 26 of 71 new 
Democrats in the 89th Congress lost their bids for re-election.
If the newly elected post-1974 Democrats entered a House that was more 
than ready to use their diverse talents, the first-term Republicans in 1995, at the 
opposite extreme, understood that they were part of an historic partisan move-
ment, led by a charismatic and revolutionary Speaker. And despite having to take 
some difficult votes, most survived, unlike the 1964 Democrats. Even as Ging-
rich’s leadership fell apart over the next few years, the Class of 1994 remained 
part of a largely unified Republican majority in an increasingly polarized partisan 
chamber.
The Watergate Babies were then, in both temporal and behavioral senses, 
roughly in-between. “Even 10 years later, observed Rep. Butler Derrick (D-SC), 
in discussing how he worked to get things done in the House, “I go to my 
buddies in the Class of ’74. We’ve now moved up to middle management.”14 For 
Derrick and his many surviving “buddies,” middle management meant that 
they served as subcommittee chairs or as members of powerful committees. 
Indeed, virtually all the remaining members of the Class of 1974 served in such 
position by their fourth terms (1981–1982).15 But even as they entered the Con-
gress, the post-Watergate Democrats were unusually active legislators. In the 
94th Congress (1975–1976), more than a third of them floor-managed a major 
bill or amendment, and almost all first-term Democrats offered floor amend-
ments (two-thirds successfully) as well as putting forth successful amend-
ments in committees and subcommittees.16 And seven in ten of them served 
on a conference committee, while a similar percentage gave a “major” floor 
speech.
Although comparative data for the large 1964 class are spotty, none floor-
managed a major bill or amendment, and only 12% offered floor amendments. 
To be sure by 1975, the House had become a more accommodating place for new 
members, but the 1974 Democrats took full advantage of their opportunities. And 
this continued throughout their careers in the House, at least until, ironically, 
the Gingrich cohort helped Republicans take over the House, a domination that 
would remain for sixteen of the next 20 years. Thus, just when the remaining 1974 
14 Quoted in Loomis, The New American Politician 49.
15 Burdett Loomis, “Congressional Careers and Party Leadership in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives,” American Journal of Political Science 28, (1984), 180–202.
16 Loomis, New American Politician 40.
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Democratic legislators were about to wield their greatest committee influence, 
they lost the chance to serve as chairs until 2007. By then, their ranks were to be 
considerably thinned.
Various studies of the 104th GOP House cohort show evidence of a class rela-
tively legislatively accomplished because it maintained its collective identity with 
a bulldog grip through its first two congressional terms. Members of group stuck 
together so as to give House Speaker Gingrich and the Republican Whip system 
a bargaining tool both in the chamber and when dealing with Republicans in 
the Senate. It is widely recognized that while Newt Gingrich was House Speaker 
he frequently used the famed (but exaggerated) cohesion of the 104th cohort to 
claim impending calamities for legislative progress unless the demands of the 
104th were addressed.17
By presenting the leadership’s agenda as the class’s agenda, then tutoring 
the class on what he hoped to accomplish, the Speaker was able move his policy 
goals forward more expeditiously than would have been the case absent a gener-
ally cooperative freshman class. In time, however, Gingrich would learn that class 
members had many of their own ideas and that they were less willing to be cowed 
or co-opted than he imagined.
Part of Gingrich’s exaggerated confidence that he could lead the 104th fresh-
men derived from the ways he successfully cultivated, mentored, and encouraged 
the class, especially in the run-up to the historic 1994 election. Operating tacti-
cally for months prior the 1994 elections (and continuing his educative strategies 
thereafter), Gingrich flooded prospective members of the new Republican insur-
gency with cassette tapes, pamphlets, books, and memos that presented a unified 
vision and plan to his prospective troops.
On the other hand, by 2005–2006, the group’s sixth congress, the class’s 
influence had waned, especially in comparison to the 94th’s ascendency, not only 
because of less committee-based power, but also thanks to the shrinkage of the 
cohort to 23 members – less than one-third of their original size. Actually, based 
upon interviews with cohort members and their senior staffers in 1997 and there-
after, it appears that the class forfeited much of its sense of class identity begin-
ning with the 106th Congress in 1999. What bound members together thereafter 
was not class organization but a sense of legislative learning acquired during the 
class’s first two terms in office, as it became part of the party-dominated chamber 
under the influence of Minority Leader Tom DeLay and the party-based require-
ments of the so-called Hastert rule.
17 See Barnett, Legislative Learning.
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The Long Tail: How Large Partisan Congressional 
Classes Can Affect Policy and Politics over Time
Although reporters usually lose interest in large cohorts, and these cohorts grad-
ually surrender their identity, this does not mean that such groups do not remain 
influential in many ways. For example, although the large Democratic cohort of 
1964 was crucial to enacting many pieces of Great Society legislation, the sub-
stantial demise of their members in their initial bid for re-election also meant 
that they would wield less power as time went on, simply because of diminished 
numbers of members who could grasp the opportunities that opened up in the 
years/decades to come.18
At the same time, one of their members, Washington state’s Tom Foley, 
became chair of the Agriculture Committee in 1975, after only five terms in the 
House, when its chair was displaced by the Democratic Caucus vote at the start 
of the 94th Congress. He would later become Speaker, losing his seat in 1994 and 
thus becoming a part of three major upheavals in House membership. Foley’s 
ascension illustrates how luck (in the form of the 1974 ouster of Agriculture Chair 
Poage), talent, and durability can shape congressional careers. By the time he 
became Speaker, Foley was rarely identified as part of the large 89th Congres-
sional class, yet his experiences as a member of that group and the step up he 
received by surviving (in a tough district) the 1966 GOP backlash, gave him a con-
siderable advantage early in his House tenure. And moving quickly into leader-
ship allowed him to demonstrate his considerable political skills.
Thus, beyond a cohort’s survival in raw numbers, the entrance of a large 
group allows a disproportionate number of them the opportunity to move into 
powerful positions within the chamber. It also, provides the opportunity for the 
cohort’s members to run for higher office, most notably the US Senate. Although 
many members of the 1974 class failed here, a substantial number succeeded (see 
below), and in this way spread the overall influence of this group – albeit in far 
less ideological ways than that of other classes (e.g., the long-lasting the distinc-
tive Senate careers of Montana’s Max Baucus and Iowa’s Tom Harkin).
In addition, given the relative youth the members of recent large cohorts, 
many of them used the Congress as a springboard to subsequent careers, where 
they could enrich themselves and/or continue to have an impact on public policy, 
even after an electoral defeat. For example, New York’s Tom Downey, a poster 
18 At the same time, one of their members, Tom Foley, became chair of the Agriculture Com-
mittee in 1975, after only five terms in the House, after its chair was displaced by the Democratic 
Caucus vote at the start of the 94th Congress; he would later become Speaker, of course, losing 
his seat in 1994, thus being a part of three major upheavals in House membership.
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boy for the youth of the Class of 1974, given that he began his service at age 25, 
lost his bid for reelection in 1992. Subsequently, he formed a major D.C. lobbying 
firm, with former Republican Representative Ray McGrath. The Downey/McGrath 
team certainly “did well,” in economic terms, but it also “did good” by taking on 
a number of pro bono clients (e.g., Cochlear Americas, which provided hearing 
surgeries), whom it helped to significant policy victories.
In short, while the immediate and mid-range impacts of large cohorts may be 
the most visible manifestations of their entry into Washington politics, a much 
fuller, long-term accounting is required in order to assess the overall impact of 
their presence.
The First 20 Years of the 1974 and 1994 Cohorts
As the Watergate Babies (sic) and the Gingrich cohort reach the 40- and 20-year 
anniversaries of their initial sweeping victories, we can directly compare their first 
20 years of experience. This is a limited perspective, to be sure, but it will provide 
some outlines of how large classes evolve in contemporary politics, realizing at 
the same time that every class’s context is different. We will briefly examine sur-
vival rates, attempts to advance (and successes), and post-congressional experi-
ences for those who no longer remain in the House.
Almost by definition, large partisan classes are apt to lose a fair number 
of members early in their tenure. Many legislators have won marginal seats, or 
even those that favor the opposing party. Moreover, partisan sweeps may usher 
into office legislators who turn out not be especially skilled. The 1994 class had 
more than its share of the latter. Even as the GOP retained its House majority in 
the election of 1996, thirteen first-term members lost their seats, and two others 
left (see Table 2). In contrast, the Watergate babies lost only two members in 
1976, which was a good Democratic year. But their ranks were reduced in 1978 
Table 2 Size of 1974 Democratic and 1994 Republican Partisan Cohorts* during Their First Ten 
Congresses.
  Initial N  N after:  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992
1974 Dems  75    73  62  47  39  31  27  26  25  16
    N in:  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012
1994 GOP   73    58  50  42  32  30  23  14  10  7
*For those with continuous service.
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(six losing candidates) and especially 1980, when 12 members of the class lost 
their seats.
Overall, the ranks of the two large classes declined in roughly similar numbers 
over the course of their first 12 years see (Table 2). But the 1974 group remained 
more intact through the late 1980s, as their members moved into increasing posi-
tions of responsibility. The Republicans from the 1994 class, on the other hand, 
retired in greater numbers, often as a result of personal pledges to limit their 
terms. (See Table 3) No member of the ’74 class made such a pledge.
What Table 2 omits, however, is that between losing elections and retire-
ments in 1992 and 1994, the Democratic Class of 1974 dropped from 25 members 
in the 102nd Congress (1991–1992) to just eight in the 104th Congress (1995–1996). 
Although eight of the Watergate babies lost in 1992, the year of the banking 
scandal and reapportionment/redistricting, none were defeated in 1994. But, 
perhaps anticipating trouble, six retired. Only eight of their members remained 
to endure minority status for the first time in their careers. Of those eight in the 
subsequent 20 years, just two were defeated, while six retired, culminating with 
Waxman and Miller before the 2014 elections. Only those two, plus Minnesota’s 
Jim Oberstar, stayed in the House long enough to wield power as committee 
chairs in the 110th and 111th Congresses (2007–2011), with Oberstar losing his 
seat in a 2010 upset.
Looking at the exit paths for these two large classes, the similarities out-
weigh any differences, especially given the wave of Democratic retirements in the 
run-up to the 1994 elections. Indeed, there is some irony that so many remaining 
Democrats from the Class of 1974 decided to leave, just prior to the impressive 
entrance of the Gingrich cohort into the House. Taking into account the actions 
of members from both classes, after electoral defeat, the two major avenues for 
leaving the House are choosing retirement or seeking a Senate seat. Twenty-nine 
members from the two groups retired and twenty-nine sought a Senate seat, 














Gen.   Primary Won   Lost Won   Lost
1974 Democrats, (N = 60)   10   26   6   6   9   2   0   1
1994 Republicans, (N = 66)  19   24   3   5#   9   1   3   2
*Several members of the Class of 1994 returned to the House after defeat within the first 20 
years.
#One senator was appointed.
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eleven successfully. In a sense, both these choices involve “exit” in Hirschman’s 
terminology, albeit through different routes.19
Given that the average age of these classes is relatively low and that most 
members leave the House within a decade (61 of 148 total of the two classes remain 
into the sixth term), a substantial amount of a cohort’s impact may actually take 
place after its members exit the House. Although a (very) few members opt to run 
for governor, of those remaining in government, the largest group moves into the 
Senate. At the same time, most of those who retire or lose end up in the private 
sector, and here the differences between the two classes are substantial.
Moving Up
One measure of the impact of any congressional cohort is the number of individu-
als who have successfully moved up the political ladder. The obvious two targets 
are the Senate and home-state governorships, although Cabinet positions and 
even the presidency are not beyond aspiration. Clearly, and unsurprisingly, the 
Senate is the preferred target, and, as noted, large numbers of legislators from 
both classes have sought Senate seats. Both classes have had their successes in 
seeking the Senate, although on balance the impact of the Class of 1994 Reubli-
cans has been greater.
Seven Class of 1994 MCs advanced to the upper chamber, with five (Brown-
back [KS], Chambliss[GA], Graham[SC], Burr[NC], and the appointed Wicker[MS]) 
coming directly from the House, while Ensign[NV] lost an initial Senate race 
in 2000 only to win in 2002, and Tom Coburn honored a term-limit pledge and 
left the House before moving up in 2004. The overall impact of these members 
has been modest, although Chambliss, Graham, and Burr continue to serve, 
and Brownback, after an abortive presidential bid in 2008, returned to Kansas 
and won its governorship, perhaps as a means of building a base for another 
presidential run. Overall, they fit with Sean Theriault’s depiction of the “Gingrich 
senators,” who entered the upper chamber from the House, bringing with them a 
partisan approach to legislative politics.20
Within the Democrats’ Class of 1994, six MC’s won election to the Senate –  
Baucus[MT], Dodd [CN], Harkin[IA], Simon[IL], Tsongas[MA], and Wirth[CO], 
while Texas’s Bob Krueger was appointed. The numbers for the two classes are 
identical – six elected and one appointed senator, but the 1994 group, with three 
19 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
20 Sean Theriault, The Gingrich Senators (New York: Oxford, 2013).
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significant committee chairs (Baucus, Dodd, and Harkin) and two presidential 
candidates (Tsongas and Simon), appears, as of 2014, to have had collectively a 
greater impact, especially if Vermont’s Patrick Leahy, veteran Judiciary chair and 
first elected in 1974, is added to the mix. 
Perhaps most significantly in terms of impact, the Watergate Class produced 
three Senate committee chairs (four with Leahy) in the 111th Congress (2009–
2010): Baucus on Finance with intense healthcare negotiations; Dodd on Banking 
and the Dodd-Frank regulatory legislation; and Harkin on the Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions Committee. Along with the three House committee chairs – 
Waxman on Energy and Commerce, Miller on Education and Labor, and Oberstar 
on Transportation – there was very little domestic legislation not touched upon 
by these surviving members. Thirty-five years after entering the House, the diver-
sity in ideology and in policy interests among the class remained evident, with 
the committee chairs as a group definitely tilted in a more liberal direction than 
the original House class.
Aside from Brownback, two other 1994 GOP entrants served as governor: 
Maryland’s Bob Erlich, who won his first of two terms in 2002, and South Caroli-
na’s Mark Sanford, who likewise won in 2002 and served two terms.21 And just two 
Democrats from the 1974 groups – Michigan’s Jim Blanchard and New Jersey’s 
Jim Florio – won governorships. Without question, most the classes’ ambitions 
focused on the Senate, not the statehouse. After retirement and legislative defeat, 
losing a bid for the Senate stands as the most common route to exiting the House.
For many of the policy entrepreneurs in the Class of 1974, the Senate appeared 
as a bright opportunity, even when held by Republicans in the 1981–1987 period. 
As Illinois Senator Paul Simon put it after winning election to the Senate in 1984, 
“I love it. I’m on a five-person subcommittee, and if I can get one Republican to go 
along with my Democratic colleague and me, we can move a piece of legislation to 
the full committee.” After a decade in the far more restrictive House, even after the 
reforms of the 1970s, the Senate looked like a toy-store to the policy-oriented Simon.
Moving Out
In the end, everyone does leave the House, although relatively few leave “feet 
first,” in contrast to earlier generations. What that means, conversely, is that 
21 Among a host of scandal-plagued members of both classes (see below), Sanford may stand 
out as the strangest case, given the public playing out of his philandering, even after he returned 
to the House in 2013.
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former legislators have the opportunity to remain active in politics long after they 
have exited the House (or Senate). This paper can just skim the surface of these 
post-Capitol Hill activities, but one clear difference between the two classes does 
emerge: more 1974 Democrats ultimately became lobbyists than did their 1994 
counterparts, who were more likely to move into media roles.
The best example of the 1974 lobbyists is probably Marty Russo, who lost 
his 1992 bid for reelection and seamlessly became a major D.C. lobbyist, rising 
to become CEO of Cassiday and Associates, the leading practitioner of so-called 
“earmark lobbying.”22 At least a third of former 1974 class members have engaged 
in lobbying or the typical D.C. combination of law and lobbying, reflecting broad 
trends in revolving door politics and the rise of insider-based lobbying.23
That contrasts sharply with the 1994 entrants, although a few have become 
prominent lobbyists, including J.C. Watts and Steve Largent (coincidentally both 
former star football players). Rather, the 1994 cohort has produced a number 
of prominent media figures, most notably Joe Scarborough, the principal on 
MSNBC’s long-running Morning Joe show. Perhaps as much as any of his col-
leagues, Scarborough has embraced Newt Gingrich’s public style, balancing 
political commentary, showmanship, and good humor to emerge as an influential 
voice, not only on the right but also across the political spectrum.
In his under-appreciated book, Capitol Investments, Glenn Parker argues 
that, aside from the conventional motives that we ascribe to MCs in office, they 
also knowingly prepare themselves for post-Congress employment. Drawing 
on a human capital model, Parker states, “rational politicians obtain material 
benefits but do not do so through any devious manipulation of policies or office 
prerogatives…. [P]oliticians anticipate the returns that can be obtained through 
on-the-job investments in human capital and accordingly adjust their activities 
in office….[L]egislators profit from the skills they have acquired, the contacts they 
have made, and more generally the human capital they have acquired.”24
Former Representatives Russo and Scarborough offer apt illustrations of 
Parker’s thesis. Russo, as a Chicago-based insider with a gregarious personality, 
could move easily into the world of high-powered lobbying from his seat on the 
Ways and Means Committee, which he occupied for 14 years. Scarborough, on the 
other hand, voluntarily resigned from the Congress in 2001, in his fourth term, 
22 See Robert Kaiser, So Damned Much Money (New York: Vintage, 2010).
23 See, among others, Timothy M. LaPira, Herschel F. Thomas III and Frank Baumgartner, “The 
Two Worlds of Lobbying: Washington Lobbyists in the Core and on the Periphery,” Interest 
Groups & Advocacy 3, no. 3 (October) (2014) 210–45.
24 Glenn Parker, Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2008), 4.
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and quickly used his personality and media savvy to become a broadcast person-
ality and analyst. Russo certainly would have been happy to stay in the House, 
at least as long as Democrats held a majority, but for Scarborough the long slog 
through the House hierarchy held few attractions.
By and large, the Class of 1974 members were more likely to stay in Wash-
ington than were those who entered in 1994. The Watergate babies grew up with 
a Washington that they helped to create and that they felt comfortable with. 
Several in the Gingrich cohort limited themselves to three terms, and left. Others 
were never socialized into the Washington scene, with some never establishing 
a D.C. residence. Still, one size does not fit all, and some individuals from both 
classes would be able to navigate the D.C. waters in any weather.
Take, for example, former Representatives Norm Mineta (D-CA) and Ray 
LaHood (R-IL), both of whom ended up serving in the cabinet of a president from 
the opposing party – Mineta as Secretary of Transportation for George W. Bush, 
and LaHood in the same job for Barack Obama. With their muted ideologies, 
warm personalities, and willingness to reach across the aisle, they would have 
been perfect candidates for such jobs in any era. While Mineta was not out of the 
mainstream of the 1974 class, LaHood was clearly more moderate than his col-
leagues, and the ones who followed him into the House. The fact that he accepted 
an Obama appointment sets him apart from almost all contemporary GOP House 
members.
The range of successful post-Congress careers is great for both classes, but the 
1974 group again is especially noteworthy. Paul Simon wrote twenty-plus books 
and started a major policy institute at Southern Illinois University. Bob Edgar, a 
minister, became head of Common Cause. Tim Wirth served as an ambassador. 
Bob Carr and Rick Nolan returned to the House, with Nolan’s 30-year hiatus rep-
resenting a congressional record.
The classes did not socialize all their members in similar ways, but the com-
bination of entering in a wave, helping to change the House in ways the new 
members desired, and obtaining a set of skills relevant to both legislative and 
post-legislative work provides useful ways to think about how a single electoral 
event can produce changes that reverberate over decades. At the same time, some 
mention is merited of the number of scandals that members of both these groups 
brought upon themselves. About 10% of each group was tarnished by a signifi-
cant public scandal, often leading to defeat at the polls. And this does not even 
count the “victims” of the 1992 House bank scandal, in which many members 
regularly wrote bad checks on their official accounts with the payroll office.25
25 Gary C. Jacobson and Michael Dimick, “Checking Out: The Effects of Overdrafts on the 1992 
Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 8, no. 3 (August), (1994), 601–24.
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Both sexual (1974: Jenrette, Richmond; 1994: Foley) and financial scandals 
seemed commonplace, although any large group is likely to attract attention 
with its problems. Still, for all our notion of legislative learning/socialization in 
various dimensions (learning to legislate, learning to govern, developing skills, 
and – at least for the 1974 group – learning some norms), a lot of these legislators 
pushed past the bounds of propriety and, sometimes, legality. Large classes and 
favorable political situations for one party may attract a disproportionate number 
of candidates who would not run – or win – in regular electoral contexts. On the 
other hand, having a John (and Rita) Jenrette and a Freddie Richmond in your 
class will mean that things will rarely be boring.
Large Classes: Important, to a Point
With their very numbers and sometimes historical significance, large congres-
sional cohorts can have – or seem to have – disproportionate impact on the insti-
tution, its politics, and its policies. Moreover, these classes feed large numbers 
of individuals into the first rungs of significant national politics, where they 
may move in many directions, especially after leaving the House. At the same 
time, looking over the classes of 1974 Democrats and 1994 Republicans, we were 
struck by how many members came on stage as essentially political extras, only 
to vanish from public view. For many members of these groups, their greatest 
impact came with the votes they cast, alongside their fellow classmates, as they 
either tormented or supported their leaders – or some of both.
To a certain extent, these large classes are never more important than in 
their first few days. The very fact that they have entered the House and have pro-
foundly changed the balance of power, either between the parties or within them, 
is enough. Gingrich’s turbulent group worked together to a point, but their exist-
ence as part of the GOP takeover might well have been their most significant con-
tribution. On the other hand, while the Watergate babies came in with a bang and 
immediately affected how the House was run, their long-term effects over 40 years 
have been substantial, as they moved the chamber first to a highly decentralized 
body, but then helped generate an increasingly powerful party system.
The best of those legislators, such as a Henry Waxman or a George Miller in 
different ways, could negotiate paths between the committees and the leader-
ship. As new cohorts develop in a highly partisan Congress, such skills, while 
highly useful, may be in short supply. So as the Class of 1974 leaves the stage, 
and the 1994 cohort shrinks toward being a pool of water on the floor, we may 
first want to look back and more rigorously assess their impacts, and second we 
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might look ahead and assess the emerging impact of the “Tea Party” Republican 
Class of 2010.
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